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PSYCHOLOGY AND PLAUSIBILJTY IN THUCYDIDES' HISTORY 
By 
Michael C. Mittelstadt 
One of the most engaging qualities of Thucydides' History seems to be its ability 
al most everywhere to con vince the reader of the purported accuracy of its account 
of historical events. This conviction is reinforced not only by the particular sty-
listic features and historiographical method of Thucydides, which lend to it an aura 
of 'scientific' or 'objective' investigation and analysis/ but perhaps even more so 
by a particular Thucydidean view of man in nature and a fairly extensive vocabu-
lary of psychological activity to express that concept. 
by a particular Thucydidean view of man in nature and a fairly extensive vocabu-
lary of psychological activity to express that concept. 2 lt is largely through Thucy-
dides' explanation and interpretation of human events through this particular psy-
chological understanding of man that lends his work such plausibility and hence 
makes it much more aceptable to us today. Except when totally unforeseen and 
drastic accidents of fortune intervene, the procession of human events in Thucy-
dides see ms to proceed with consistent plausibility .3 
Aside from the purely stylistic features of Thucydides' History which indeed 
enhance this effect on the reader, a major factor constantly at work in the narrative 
is the author' s way of expressing and explaining motivations behind human events. 
Human thought, perception, deliberation, emotion, and action Thucydides ex-
presses in terms of a particularly fairly well definable psychology. 
Such a statement does not mean that Th ucydides' explanation of the reasons and 
motivation for each and every human act recorded in his narrative is historically 
accurate. lt only implies that his explanation is generally at once convincing and 
acceptable to the reader as historically accurate because of the psychological 
interpretive method behind it.4 Thucydides works a great deal form inference. 
Having such keen insights into human nature and such an understanding of how it 
reacts to circumstances, he is extremely adept at sizing up what most probably was 
1 Cf. C.N. Cochrane, Thucydides and the Science of History, Oxford, 1929; K. Weidauer, 
Thukydides und die Hippokratischen Schriften, Heidelberg, 1954. 
2 See W. Mueri, 'Beitrag zum Verstandnis des Thukydides', Museum Helveticum, 1947, fasc. 
4, pp. 251-275. Also E. Topitsch, 'Anthropeia Physis und E th ik bei Thukydides', Wiener 
Studien, LXI-LXII, 1943-47, pp. 50--67. Also C. Meister, Die Gnomik im Geschichts· 
werk des Thukydides, Winterthur, 1955. Especially see P. Huart, Le Vocabulaire de l' Ana-
lyse Psychologique dans I'Oeuvre de Thucydide, Paris, 1968. Also M.C. Mittelstadt, .. Thucy-
didean Psychology and Moral Value Judgement in the History; Some Observations', Rivista 
di Studi Classici, Torino, Fasc. l, 1977, pp. 30-55. 
3 Cf. W. P. Wallace, 'Thucydides', Phoenix, XVII, 4, 1964. 
4 See Wallace, op. cit.; also de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, Oxford, 1963. 
in the minds of men at any given time under any given circumstances. Given his 
own expressed theory of nature as a fixed factor - TWV T€ "f€VOJ1evwv ... Kai TWv 
J1€AAOVTWV 1TOTE av8tc: KaTd TO dv8pwmvov TOWVTWV Kai rraparr'ATJaiwv eaea8at 
(1.22.4) - reactions to circumstances have a high degree of predictability. The 
solidity of the foundations of his psychology, therefore, in large measure explain 
the degree of plausibility in his historical account. 
lt is not as if Thucydides has not to ld us very clearly from the beginning what his 
method is to be - W<: o 'dv E o dK ovv JlOL eKaUTOL rrepi TWV aei 1Tap6vrwv TU oeovra 
JldAwT' emeiv, EXOJ1EVW đn E"f"!Vrara Tije: ~VJ17TdUTJC: "fVWJ1TJC: TWV dei Xex8evrwv 
OVTWC: e'ipTJTaL (1.22.1-2). Although the statement was made specifically in regard 
to speeches, we find this same principle, or variations of it, applied also in the narra-
tive proper wherever Thucydides explains motivation. Probability, plausibility and 
consistency of motivation everywhere increase the credibility of the Thucydidean 
narrative. 
lt 'goes without say ing that the total lack of a theological superstructure and a com-
plete dependence on human psyd1ology to explain historical events give Thucydi-
des the credibility in terms of human motivation that Herodotus lacks. Herodotus, 
though also a man of keen insights into human nature, worked out no consistent 
theory of h uman nature or psyd10logy to apply to history. His is a rather tradi-
tional theological interpretation of history in any case, which precludes the kind 
of plausibility in motivation that we find in Thucydides. 5 
A number of studies6 have analyzed Thucydidean psychological theory in terms of 
a particularly Thucydidean vocabulary of human nature. Through a painstaking 
analysis of all terms in the History dealing with sensation, perception, deliberation, 
understanding and decision-making Huart especially has given us a quite accurate 
understanding of how Thucydides conceives the human 'soul' (for he does not use 
the Greek equivalent of that word, 1/lvx:ri, at all) to operate. 7 ln the first place 
Thucydides does not follow the more or less traditional tri--partite division of the 
soul into elements resembling the vouc: - iJVJlOC: - 1/>piJv categories of psychic ac-
tivity upon which Plato, of course, elaborates in his own psychology, e.g., TO 
AO"fWTLKOV TO emiJVJlf/TLKOV, TO !JvJ10€tlJEc:. At least these are not the central terms 
of Thucydidean psyd1ology. 
As a matter of fact, although Thucydides does reserve a large place for the analysis 
of human feelings in his narrative, he abandons the notion of semi--concrete facul-
5 See A. Lesky, History of Greek Literature, New York, 1966, pp. 306-328. For the idea of 
predestination and other tragic concepts related to Herodotean theology see W. Potscher, 
'Gotter und Gottheit bei Herodot', WienerStudien, 71, 1958. 
6 
vide supra n. 2 
7 Huart, p. 62 
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ties of the soul. Thucydides' porpose is not that of a philosopher like Plato, who 
studies the psychology of human beings al most entirely in the abstract, forcing his 
theory to harmonize with his theory of the universe. Thucydides set out to write a 
'scientific' history totally subordinated to the reality of facts. And for him this 
reality consists chiefly of human thoughts, feelings, emotions, and decisions which 
explain the unfolding of events. 
To be sure Thucydides does not reject the abstract. Quite the opposite. lt is only 
that he does not search for reality in philosophical generalization, but analyzes the 
various concepts within the context of real human behavior. He does not concern 
himself directly with faculties per se, i.e. what causes sensation, thought, or will, 
but what men have effectively felt, thought or willed. Thus Thucydides has a pro· 
pensity for using the verb or a verbal form more often than a substantival form. 8 
W. Mueri's study 9 has shown that none of the usual terms to describe the opera· 
tions of the human psyche - e.g. soul, spirit, temperament, heart, mind, etc. -
are really capable of conveying, or of even approximating the meaning of the 
specifically Thucydidean psychological complex. For lack of a better term Mueri, 
coining his own expression, refers to it as das lnnere. Many separate statements in 
the text of the_ History reveal a set of associative interrelationships which define a 
spiritualpsychological internal state. The whole of the human psyche cannot be 
apprehended.at all at the same time by conscious reflection, but separate psycholo· 
gicaJ relationships and facts can be sharply distinguished by observation. Thucydi· ' 
des thus grasps the significance of real events as they take place within the frame-
work of this psychological view vJhich endows them with universality and historical 
validity. 
This particular psychological complex in man as Thucydides sees it is described 
within a complex of three terms representing three types of interactive internal 
activity in man: oprr'l- ~VVEGL<;" - "fVWJlT/. The interaction between these three 
elements accounts for all human acts and thus is capable of explaining historical 
events. Both Mueri's study and Huart's analysis, statistical and otherwise, make it 
abundantly celar that these terms define the bases of Thucydidean psychology. 
The way in which Thucydides sees this 'internal state' partially eludes description 
since the meaning of one of the key concepts - "fVWJ1T1- has many nuances. Not 
only this, but also the fact that sometimes there is an overlapping or mingling of 
two concepts together - as for instance when Thucydides speaks of TO 6p-ytt6-
J1EZJOV rfic; rV<l.y.ITic; (2.59.3), or in the same sentence in which oprrj is used we find 
. a:rro'fl'"Aiiaat Trie; "fVWJ1Tic; TO 'Ć}UJ10VJ1EVOV. (7 .68.1). On the whole, however, the three 
8 Huart, p. 41-42 
9 Mueri, op. cit. l am heavily indebted to Mueri's study for many of the following observ& 
tions and remarks. 
terms are quite distinctly definable, (ft.lveaL' being mostly a synonym for [VWJ.l.T/ 
however), at least for purposes of analysis and elucidation of motivation in Thu· 
cydides. 10 
Fundamentally the psychological complex described by these terms points up the 
distinction between the irrational and the rational, mostly symbolised by the oppo· 
sition between the two terms which carry the most weight in Thucydides: the irra-
tional - dpyri and the rati ona l - [VWJ.l.T/. But oprr/ and [VWJ.l.TJ are not treated as 
faculties. For example, Huart shows that the result of the struggle between the 
Peloponnesians and the Athenians in the first year of the war depends not on the 
strictly military confrontation, but on the outcome of the opposition between the 
dpf11 ot the Athenian populace and the [vWJ.l.TJ of Pericles. 
The passage at 2.22.1 quite clearly shows the differences between the two con· 
cepts. 11 When Pericles confronts the orge of the populace, he does not interpret 
it as a theoretical and abstract disposition of the citizens which enables them 
to act more by feeling than by reason. The Athenians are certainly aggravated 
(xa'Aerraivovn:c;) at see ing their la nds ravaged before their very eyes by the enemy, 
and they would like to go out immediately to meet the foe in combat to avenge 
themselves. Their dp[rj indeed, if not checked by Perides, would force them into 
real and immediate action. On the other hand, the statesman, seeing the conse-
quences, deplores the fact that they are not guided by their [VWJ.l.TJ. 
Here it is not a matter of a reflective faculty. or of merely abstract ideas, but of 
a process of clear judgement about a given situation. Pericles is really reproaching 
his fellow citizens for not seeing that a sortie at this point against the enemy 
outside the walls would expose them to the Joss, not only of some immediate 
goods, but to a defeat which could lead to the total collapse of Athens and her 
empire. 12 
Though the struggle between dpf11 and [VWJ.l.TJ is not always presented with such 
nicety of distinction or dramatic impact, it does underline constantly the nexus 
of events and explains their connections. opf11 and fVWJ.l.TJ define the reactions of 
men in contact with reality. 
Mueri has discovered severally combined in [VWJ.l.TJ the rational, the power of re· 
flection, and the conceptual intellect.13 The semantic field which [VWf.lTJ seems to 
cover is somewhat delineated by concepts used in association with it - ~ov'Ae· 
10 On xynesis or synesis see Huart, pp. 282-5; 289-90; p. 311 
1 1 Huart, p. 56 
1 2 Huart, p. 57 
13 On gnome see Hu art pp. 56-57; 161-162; 290; 304-310; 502; 504-507 
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vea(Jat, p.rj d~VV€TOC:, ~VV€TOC:, aaj>oc:- as the unique power of thought by which 
man penetrates the shell of circumstances to the inner realities, ordering them to 
his own ends. By this power he also overcomes obstacles and directs his activity. 
As the power of thought it stands beside other powers which shape reality for him. 
Moreover, whenever the word -yvwp.TJ stands for the power of deliberative though t 
it is to some extent imbued with the emotional and the volitional, sometimes 
stronger, sometimes weaker, as the case may be. 
ln short, to generali ze and to simplify, we can say that for Thucydides -yv0JTJ 
and kindred words (like ~vveatc: for example) represent man's intellectual, reflec-
tive, and deliberative capacity -or the rational source of his actions, while dp-yrj 
defines the non-rational, more primitive, sometimes even instinctual, wellsprings 
of his activity. Here we have a typical Thucydidean antithesis and it is always the 
proper order, balance and symmetry between these two sources of motivation in 
man, with 'f'Vc4.LTJ as guide of course, that ensures the well-being both of the indi· 
vidua! and of society. Every significant and major episode in Thucydides points 
up the tragic calamities attendant upon the usurpation of dp-yrf over -yvwp.T}. One 
need not look far for examples which abound: the Plague, the Corcyrean stasis, 
the Mytilinean revolt, the consequences for Athens of her action against Melos, 
the catastrophic results of the Sicilian expedition, the outcome of the war itself. 14 
Within the compass of op-yrj lies all psychological activity relating to man's acquisi-
tive instinct and Thucydides uses a number of terms in connection with it: op€-ye-
aeat, errtevp.ia, ef...rr{c: epwc:, {)pdaoc:, etc. Such words, and primarily rrf...eove~{a 
are constantly used in Thucydides in connection with a basic drive in human na· 
ture. Its manifestation in individuals is well exemplified by a Cleon, for instance, 
or an Alcibiades. Its manifestation in the body politic is displayed pe rh aps largest 
of all in Athens and in her drive for imperial expansion. Corresponding to this 
vocabulary of 'ambition' is a vocabulary of 'effect of ambition' -'- in the case of 
Athens the progressive moral deterioration from the ideals set forth in the Fune-
ral Gration, the shocking transformation of the Athenian character as described 
in Book One at the first Spartan assembly 15 to the cynical and ruthless imperia-
lists of the Melian Dialogue in Book Five. 
On the political level of the Athenian state the vocabulary of 'ambition' is d isti lied 
by Thucydides into three key words which he explains as the basic motives for 
the expansion of the Athenian Empire: np.'T], oeoc:, 0j)ef...ia16 ·Honor and self-
-interest forced the Athenians to acquire the empire initially and fear compelled 
them to hold on to it. Another generalization, perhaps more universally appli-
cable, is found in his treatment of the Corcyrean revolution (3.82-3). Commenting 
14 On orge see Huart pp. 56-57; 156-162; 502 
1 5 Thuc. 1.74-75 
16 Thuc. 1.75.3. On motivation in Thucydides cf. W. Thompson, 'Individual Motivation in 
Thucydides', Classica et Mediaevalia, XXX, 1969. 
on the horrors of civil strife throughout the Greek world he notes niwrwv o 'a&rwv 
aCrwv dpxr] ri oui 1TA€0VE~iav Kai r/)LAOTLJ.liav, EK o. d!JTWV Kai E<: TO r/)LAOVLKEL-V 
KafJwrap€vwv ro np68vpov (3.82.8) This observation is repeated in his comparison 
of Pericles with his successors who act Kard rd<: ioia<: r/)LA.onpia<: Km Cota KEpOfl ... 
6peyOJ.l€VOL TOV 11PWTO<: eKaaro<: 'YL"'fV€U8at erpdnovro Ka8. rioovd<: TW orfpw Kai 
rd npdrpara €Kow6vat (2.65.10) Also ... Kard m<: i81a<: 8ta{3o"Ad<: rrEpi ni<: rov 
oripov npoaraaia<: ... (2.65.11). 
Such vocabulary dealing with the human appetitive drives makes it abundantly 
clear that for Thucydides individuals as well as states are primarily motivated out 
of profit, prestige, or fear. As for fear, the overwhel m ing e motion which it 
summons up, often denoted in Greek by ro oEwov is closely linked with the term 
KLVOVVO<:. 
All such concepts relating to fear point up a single limiting and constraining life 
situation - the endangerment of life and threat of annihilation. 17 Thus Kiv8vvo<: 
is often used in Thucydides both in reference to the individual and the state -
threat to individual life on the one hand, threat to the state's autonomous existence 
on the other. Ktvovvo<: is the abyss from which the people of Mytilene escape at 
the last moment through the arrival of the counter--command (3.49.4). lt is the 
catastrophe which the city of Syracuse avoided just in time through the arrival of 
Gylippus (7.2.24). lt is thus that the historian condenses events into the single 
moment in which he sees the reversal of fate taking plase. 47 
ln fact, as Mueri has shown 18 , the passages which best and most forcefully eluci-
date the idea of the state as an historical, living entity are those in which he speaks 
of the constraining, narrowing and restricting conditions of threat and danger. The 
state as a power system which confronts other powers is affected at its very center 
by a decrease in power. Thus it suffers a wound and the whole life of the state is 
put into jeopardy. Before the Sicilian invasion (the beginning of Athens' downfall 
according to Thucydides [265.11 
l 
according to Thucydides [2.65.11 ]) , Nicias voi ces a warning: in the interest of 
one's country an opinion could be voiced against the expedition on the grounds 
that Athens was contemplating the greatest of all risks she had ever undertaken 
(6.13.1): vrrep rri<: rrarpioo<: W<: J.l€"'fWTWV o€ TWV rrpiv KtvOVVOV dvappmTOVaf/<: 
dVTLX€LpOTOV€iV ... 
The tension which Ki!Xivvo<: creates is a necessary concomitant of the tyrannical 
state. Here is an idea which Peri eles, Alcibiades and Clean express in similar words: 
whoever wishes to demonstrate manly behavior without risk must do it in inacti-
vity, but the choice of a foreign policy of such inactivity will introduce the down-
17 Cf. Mueri op. cit. 
18 Mueri op. cit. 
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fall of the state (2.63.2; 3.40.4; 6.18.3.7.). Security guarantees only slavery (dKtv-
owwc; oovA.etiew r[6.80.5; 2.63.3]). 
Logically the pursuit of either intangibles (power, prestige - npri), or any other 
possession or advantage (wl/le"Aia), must begin with €A.rric; -expectation followed 
by a confirmed and optimistic hope for the successful, prosperous and gratifying 
outcome of something willed and planned. 19 lt presupposes initially a willful 
intent, a desire (3.45.5; 6.15.2; 4.103.4) ~Epwc; desire and €A.rric;, the hopeful 
expectation (3.45.5) are the two companions of many human undertakings: any 
all-engrossing, blind and optimistic scheme for the future. Success strengthens the 
hope and present good luck and favorable outcome nourish it (4.17.4;4.65.4). Its 
focal point is always future gain, in any case on something dl/xlvec; (2.42.4). 
Perhaps in his psychological understanding and explanation of the workings of 
e"Arric; in the human soul is Thucydides most eloquent. Hence a greater depth of 
plausibility is added to his work. Hope allows for little if any deliberation for 
human beings when desire takes hold of them. 20 Then they usually abandon 
themselves to unreflecting hope - always for a course of action jealously defen-
ded and which they are loathe to give up at any cost, judicious deliberation being 
the most resented obstacle (4.108.4). Hope is not only the companion, but also 
the servant of desire. Before a decision involving great risk Demosthenes (4.10) 
advises his men: in this present emergency one should be careful not to appear so 
rationally prudent as to evaluate in detail and calculate all the odds of danger at 
hand. He should, rather, go at it unreflectingly and full of the best expectations -
drrepwKerrrwc; eoe"Amc;. Reflection has no place in an emergency. Here Demosthe-
nes reckons with hope as a force which can unleash a man's powers of execution 
through the emotions. Wherever e"Arric; is at work, say the Athenians to the Melians 
(5.103), delusion is at hand: in time of danger it is surely a source of consolation, 
but it is harmful - oarravoc; -ydp <t>vaet - .,wasteful by nature". Diodotus expresses 
the same sentiments in his arguments against deterrent punishment at 3.45.5: 
if T€ e'Arric; Kai O epwc; erri rravri, o pev Tl'Y0Vf.l€VO<;, 7) o€ ecperropellT], Kai o pev 
rriv e mtlov"A?jv EK</>povri~wv, 7} o€ r?jv eiJrropiav Tije; TV\"11<: U1l'OTt0eiaa rr"Aeiara 
(3NirrTOVGL, Kai ovrad<f>avii Kpeiaaw e an TWV opwptvwvoewwv. 
The evidence for Thucydides' explanation of the psychological motivating forces 
behind human acts stems from his conviction that man in his limited abilities and 
in his psychological structure remains, as he understands it, essentially and perma-
nently unchanged. Therefore it is possible and valid for the author .to make state-
ments requiring no further substantiation. Thucydides find in man himself as he is 
a dominant, inevitable regularity of psychological economy, comprehensible in 
spite of its many ways of operations and manifestations.21 
19 Mueri op. cit. 
20 Mueri op. cit. On elpis cf. also Huart pp. 145-149. 
21 Mueri op. cit. 
This conviction of the unchangeability of human existence and of the law of ne-
cessity in the adjustment and reaction to given external conditions is the principle 
by which the aim of Thucydides' historical work is understandable. This unalte-
rable human .nature also determines, for example, that the prevailing consensus on 
the nature of justice can place no Jimits on the violence of man: Tr€</>VKaa{ 1€ 
arraVTEC: Kai lOiq Kai O'TIJlOaiq aJl.aprd.vetv (3.45.3). This elementa! drive does not 
allow itself, even th rough force of law, to be suppressed by any threat whatsoever 
(3.45.3 and 7). The activity of man is determined from ultimate elementa! drives, 
i.e. once set in motion, necessary, according to a law of regularity. Therefore hu· 
man activity is also the object of an understanding which can exist as a lasting, 
useful possession. 
lt is not without importance that the concluding sentence of 3.45 - a chapter 
treating of human nature in a fundamental way - makes a povverful statement: 
"Finally, it is impossible to prevent, and only great simplicity can hope to prevent, 
human nature from doing what it has once set its mind upon, by ·force of law or 
by any o th er deter rent whatsoever." 
The shattering historical events of this century itself, let alone those of the previous 
twenty odd intervening centuries, certainly bear Thucydides out. Here is precisely 
why we find Thucydides' historical account so plausible. We also tend to accept his 
psychology and theory of human nature22 since we have witnessed its effects and 
manifestations ourselves so many times recently in this century alone. But Thucy- 49 
dides view of human nature need not lead us to conclude that there is no hope for 
man. On the contrary, perhaps Thucydides is merely telling us that there is a co-
gent need to rethink certain 'principles' in consideration of the realities of human 
nature. At 3.82 Thucydides does not say expressly that human nature will always 
be the same, but as long as human nature is the same. ewe; dv ... !1 -a slight nuance 
which allows for the possibility even if remote, for improvement. He seems to be 
stating that it is impossible to hope to modify the mentality of human beings 
except by forcing them to reflect upon the realities confronting them in· order to 
arrive at a better understanding of their real significance. But improvement must 
proceed gradually and men must learn to unshackle themselves from their passions 
(op'Y'Ti) at such times, and learn the true guidance of reason and judicious decision 
('YVWJl.T/). Thus Thucydides seems to be presenting history in terms of a constant 
struggle - incessantly waged within each individual - between the impulses of 
22 Topitsch (op. cit.) has shown that by dv1Jpw1rela rfl{X1!~ Thucydides means only those po-
wers which we might term natural, primitive or instinctual and which, in spite of their 
elementa! force, do not constitute the whole man. These forces are more at home in the ~ 
lower regions of the psyche, the primitiveness which all men share in common. 'Av1Jpw1rda 
r/lUatt deranges the life of individuals as well as the social order by stirring up war of all 
against all. ln spite of the restraints and sanctions of nomos repeatedly the destructive 
forces of instinct break through. 
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op'Y7i and the rational, reflective powers of 'YIJWJ.lTJ. The tri u m ph of oprri over 
rvc4LTJ is thus inevitably tragi.c, the triumph of 'YIJWJ.l'Tl spiritual, moral, and even 
materialistic success. 
Michael C. Mittelstadt 
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PSIHOLOGIJA l UVJERLJIVOST U TUKIDIDOVOJ "POVIJESTI" 
Uvjerenje što ga čitalac stječe o brižnosti s kojom Tukidid izvješćuje o povijesnim 
zbivanjima uvjetovano je u velikoj mjeri posebnim Tukididovim pogledom na čovje· 
kov položaj u prirodi i posebnim načinom psihološkog izražavanja koje daje čvrsto· 
ću i uvjerljivost njegovu djelu. 
Tukididov pojam "duše" ne slijedi manje ili više tradicionalnu tročlanu podjelu na 
elemente koji nalikuju na vou<; -:- 11VJ10<: - cppriv. Ključni pojmovi Tukididova izra· 
žavanja psihološke aktivnosti jesu izrazi op')"T/ i 'YIJWJ.lT/, koji prilično dobro na opće· 
nit način definiraju polove Tukididove psihologije: op')"T/ emocionalnu i neracional· 
nu sferu aktivnosti, 'YvWJ.lTJ intelektualnu, vol jn u, prosudbenu i racionalnu. Ali 
Tukidid ne upotrebljava ove izraze za sposobnosti duše, poput Platona, na primjer. 
T ukid idova se psihologija ne temelji na teoretskim apstrakcijama, nego na stvarnim 
povijesnim događajima - na onom što su ljudi doista osjećali, mislili ili htjeli. 
Upravo time što 'YIJWJ.l'Tl kontrolira op')"T/, osigurava se ljudska dobrobit, individualna 
i društvena. Svaka značajnija veća epizoda u Tukididu ukazuje na tragične nesreće 
koje su posljedica nasilja opyr] nad 'YVWJ.lT/. 
Kao osnovne motive i države i pojedinca navodi Tukidid TLJ111. oeo<;, wcpe"A..la. Tuki· 
d idov rječnik obiluje riječima koje se odnose na čovjekov grabežni instinkt i onima 
koje se odnose na ugrožavanje ili opasnost za egzistenciju ili sigurnost. Prema Tuki· 
didu, glavna čovjekova zla proizlaze iz tih grabežnih instinkata. 
Tukididova psihologija također pretpostavlja očevidnu neizmjenljivost ljudske pri· 
rode. Ona je ocrtana kao elementaran nagon, gotovo nezadrživ, koji je nemoguće 
potisnuti bilo kakvom prijetnjom ili zakonom. No upravo je zbog toga ljudska 
aktivnost razumljiva i do neke mjere pretkaziva, a čak je moguća i skromna moguć· 
nost za mijenu nabolje ako se čovjeka može prisiliti da razmisli o stvarnosti s ko· 
jom je sučeljen. Za to bi bio nuždan trijumf 'YVWJ.l'Tl nad opyr]. 
